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Turning in the Widening Gyre: History, Corporate 
Accountability, and Transitional Justice in 
the Postcolony 
Jeffrey Atteberry 
Abstract 
 
This Article argues that transitional justice, by increasing efforts to include corporate 
accountability within its various mechanisms, may confront the global structures of rule that 
systematically produce conditions of violence within formerly colonized nation-states. Building on 
work by Giorgio Agamben and Homi Bhabha, I demonstrate that the very notion of a 
“transition” around which transitional justice is articulated derives from a nineteenth-century 
understanding of history that reflects the ideology of development which supported the colonial 
system. Moments of violent historical discontinuity, legally conceptualized as “states of exception,” 
provide the paradigmatic bases for models of transitional justice. But, in the history of the 
postcolony, this state of exception functioned as the generalized rule for governance. Accordingly, 
following scholars Achille Mbembe, Laurel Fletcher, and Harvey M. Weinstein, transitional 
justice must adopt an ecological approach that embraces the lived historical experience of the 
postcolony, including its unique structures of governance. The history of Sierra Leone provides a 
case study of how the legacy of colonial governmentality persists in the present global order, creating 
the kinds of atrocities that transitional justice aims to remediate. Specifically, the colonial model 
of indirect rule has become reconfigured such that the postcolonial government secures legitimacy 
by meditating between local populations and non-state actors, including transnational 
corporations. To restructure these relationships effectively, transitional justice must, therefore, 
engage with the ongoing work toward corporate accountability. By advocating for legally binding 
mechanisms addressing corporate impunity and incorporating the U.N. Guiding Principles into 
the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, transitional justice can further advance its 
core objectives and the movement toward corporate accountability more generally. 
 
 
 
                                                 
  I would like to thank Jamie O’Connell and Alice M. Miller for their insightful instruction and 
support with the ideas and research behind this Article.  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 334 Vol. 19 No. 2 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 335 
II. The Exceptional Historicism of Postcolonial Transitions .............................. 337 
III. Expanding the Ecological Scope of Transitional Justice ............................... 344 
IV. The Dialectical Image of Sierra Leone as Postcolony: A Brief Case Study 349 
V. Transitional Justice and Transnational Corporations ...................................... 357 
A. The Modern History of Corporate Accountability for Human Rights .... 357 
B. Integrating Corporate Accountability into Transitional Justice ................. 369 
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 374 
 
  
Turning in the Widening Gyre Atteberry  
Winter 2019 335 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The field of transitional justice finds itself at a historical crossroads. Not only 
has it acquired its own place within the interdisciplinary niches of the 
contemporary academy, but it has become an express component of official U.N. 
policy concerning “post-conflict societies.”1 Insofar as the theory and practice of 
transitional justice are articulated from within the organizational structures of the 
international governance regime, the framework of transitional justice may 
become increasingly determined by the same historical and ideological forces that 
have shaped these institutions. To that extent, the work of transitional justice runs 
the risk of reproducing, rather than restructuring, the underlying dynamics and 
forces that have created the various social catastrophes that it would hope to 
remedy. If, therefore, transitional justice is to fulfill its aspirations of restorative 
justice and peaceful transition to governance regimes more solicitous of human 
rights, then both its theory and practice need to reach beyond the constraints 
imposed by these influences and find ways to engage them rather than be shaped 
by them.  
This Article seeks to open a critical relation within transitional justice to two 
related conceptual constraints which the field has inherited from the hegemonic 
discourses on international law, politics, and history. First, and particularly with 
respect to the field’s engagement with the postcolonial states of sub-Saharan 
Africa, transitional justice needs to examine the underlying conception of history 
that shapes its theory and, as a result, its practice. The field of transitional justice 
remains, like the rest of international law and policy, beholden to what I will call 
a “historicist” understanding of history that is itself intimately related to the 
development of colonialist relations which have largely determined the histories 
of postcolonial Africa. Consequently, insofar as transitional justice is concerned 
with questions of historical transition, its own conception of history must be 
decolonized if it hopes to develop a historical understanding of the social 
processes at work within the postcolony and to develop policies and strategies for 
interrupting the future operation of those processes. Second, the field of 
transitional justice needs to maintain its critical distance from the concept of the 
“failed state,”2 which is so frequently used to describe these “conflict and post-
conflict societies,” especially within the Global South. The very notion of the 
“failed state” emerges, in fact, as a conceptual symptom of historicist thinking. 
                                                 
1  See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 
U.N. Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004). 
2  For a critical history of the term “failed state,” see Henry J. Richardson III, “Failed States,” Self-
Determination, and Preventative Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L 
& COMP. L.J. 1 (1996). See also David Caron, If Afghanistan Has Failed, Then Afghanistan Is Dead: “Failed 
States” and the Inappropriate Substitution of Legal Conclusion for Political Description, in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE IN AMERICA 214 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2005). 
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Whatever limited analytic value the term may have from a sociological perspective, 
the concept of the “failed state” would pose immense problems were it adopted 
as legal doctrine, and the limitations it imposes upon critical thinking about the 
forces behind the contemporary crises in the postcolonial state are no less 
significant. 
While the work of transitional justice stands in need of a critical engagement 
with the colonialist legacies of the discourses and institutions with which it is 
necessarily engaged, it must be stressed that this call to decolonize the imagination 
of transitional justice does not reflect a normative judgment reserved for it alone. 
As a descriptive matter, the need for decolonizing the world of international legal 
discourse and practice extends across the board. Rather, directing this 
decolonizing imperative specifically at transitional justice reflects a recognition 
and a hope that transitional justice, insofar as its practice is increasingly situated 
on the ground in the heart of the postcolony, offers a singular point of 
intervention in the processes that are structuring contemporary global relations. 
The work of transitional justice in sub-Saharan Africa may be imagined as having 
a role to play in the ongoing decolonization that, in strict adherence to the 
historicism that has directed its processes, arguably remains tragically incomplete. 
In order to assume such a role, however, transitional justice needs to decolonize 
its own historical imagination3 insofar as it remains structured by historicism.  
Transitional justice can advance its own development in this respect by 
engaging concretely with the ongoing international movement for the 
development of legal mechanisms that would hold corporations accountable for 
human rights violations. From the very beginning, corporations have played a 
critical role in the exceptional governance regimes that characterize the colonial 
experience. Following decolonization, however, as the former colonizing nation-
states have formally withdrawn from rule, corporate actors have rushed in to fill 
the void and only assumed more importance in the governance of the postcolony.  
Accordingly, the Global South has long been engaged in an effort to hold 
transnational corporations responsible for human rights violations resulting from 
their activities. Today, these efforts have manifested themselves in efforts to 
develop a binding international legal instrument for corporate accountability.4 
Transitional justice should actively engage with these ongoing efforts and seek 
ways to address corporate liability for ongoing human rights violations. 
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part II examines the “historicist” 
conception of history that has structured the theory and practice of transitional 
justice as a field. In particular, as the very word “transitional” implies, the field of 
transitional justice is conceptually predicated upon an understanding of history in 
                                                 
3  See NGŨGĨ WA THIONG’O, DECOLONISING THE MIND (1986). 
4  See Human Rights Council Res. 26/…, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014); Human 
Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/Res/26/9 (June 26, 2014). 
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which certain periods of instability or chaos are posited as a moment of 
discontinuity from the normative development of a nation-state. However, this 
understanding of history does not adequately describe the lived historical 
experience of postcolonial nations where much of the transitional justice work 
takes place, because the colonial experience was structured as a permanent state 
of exception. Building on this recognition, Part III articulates an expanded 
ecological vision of transitional justice work. Such a vision would reach the various 
non-state actors that have assumed important governance roles in the postcolonial 
nation-state, including transnational corporations. Part IV turns to the history of 
Sierra Leone as a case study in how the themes of Parts II and III have materially 
manifested themselves in the colonial history of that country, its civil war, and the 
transitional justice efforts that followed. Finally, Part V outlines the history of the 
ongoing effort in the international human rights community to develop a legal 
regime of corporate accountability. The successful articulation of transitional 
justice work with the corporate accountability movement would further advance 
the objectives of transitional justice and be an important development in the 
decolonization of the international human rights regime. 
II.  THE EXCEPTIONAL HISTORICISM OF 
POSTCOLONIAL TRANSITIONS  
The field of transitional justice, by virtue of the fact that its practice is 
situated between temporally distinct political regimes, deeply engages questions of 
history. The historical dimension of transitional justice finds its strongest 
institutional expression perhaps in the work of truth commissions, typically 
charged with the task of archiving and chronicling the events surrounding the 
transition. For example, the Argentinian National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) produced Nunca Más, which has become 
the definitive history of the disappearances that occurred during the Dirty War.5 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was officially charged 
with a mandate to establish “as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature 
and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed . . . 
including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations.”6 
Similarly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (TRCSL) 
took an especially broad view of its mandate “to investigate and report on the 
causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses [related to the 1991 conflict], 
                                                 
5  See NUNCA MAS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED 
(Ernesto Sabato ed., Farrar Strauss & Giroux 1986) (1984). See also LUIS RONIGER & MARIO 
SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMAN-RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, 
CHILE, AND URUGUAY 62–63 (1999). 
6  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 3(1)(a) (S. Afr.). 
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including their antecedents.”7 In so doing, the TRCSL’s final report included an 
account of Sierra Leone’s colonial history that reached back to its founding as the 
Crown Colony State in 1808.8 However, the work of memory and history-telling 
is not limited to truth commissions; criminal tribunals in times of transition also 
play a part in the process of putting discrete events into a coherent historical 
narrative. For example, the prosecution of the leaders of Argentina’s military junta 
became a national spectacle in which the abuses of the prior regime were revealed 
through testimony from various quarters, including former members of the 
military.9 Similarly, the trials in the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia 
have established a set of historical facts that have effectively narrowed the 
historical narratives that can plausibly be told about the region and the conflict.10 
While the production of histories is an integral part of transitional justice, 
both the theoretical discourse and legal practice of transitional justice take shape 
against the horizon of a conception of history that the field rarely examines. 
Vibrant debates about the social effectiveness of history as truth-telling animate 
the field,11 but these arguments remain relatively localized inquiries that do not 
examine the underlying philosophy of history. The immanent but unexamined 
philosophy of history animating transitional justice not only frames these discrete 
and localized analyses, but structures the discourse of transitional justice in 
general. To the extent that any concept of history necessarily imposes constraints 
on both how the relationship between events are constructed and what constitutes 
an event in the first place, the discourse and practice of transitional justice remains 
cabined within the confines of its tacit historicism. While such limitations are 
unavoidable as an epistemological matter, they become ideological obstacles to a 
discourse at the point that they impose conceptual restraints which systematically 
produce misapprehensions in the discourse’s relationship to its object of 
representation. In the case of transitional justice, this potential problem becomes 
most acute when transitional justice, which has become increasingly generalized 
as it has embraced more historically and politically diverse situations, is 
programmatically applied to the postcolonial context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                 
7  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 § 6(2)(a) (Sierra Leone). 
8  SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO TRUTH, vol. 3A, ¶¶ 9–50 
(2004). 
9  See RONIGER & SZNAJDER, supra note 5, at 66–67. 
10  See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF ICTY IN SERBIA 
(2008). 
11  See, for example, THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 
(Alexandra Barahona De Brito et al. eds., 2001); Rosalind Shaw, Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 183–207 (2007). See also 
David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 355–80 (2004). 
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Confronting the limits of transitional justice’s historical imagination requires 
first teasing out its implicit conception of history. Ruti Teitel’s work, insofar as it 
offers a sustained meditation upon the kinds of historical work that transitional 
justice performs, offers a useful point of entry.12 In Transitional Justice, Teitel 
introduces her chapter on “Historical Justice” by writing: 
Transitions appear—almost by definition—to imply periods of historical 
discontinuity. Wars, revolutions, and repressive rule represent gaps in the life 
of the state that threaten its historical continuity. The questions that arise are: 
as a descriptive matter, how do societies treat these periods of apparent 
historical glitch? To what extent is the response to past evil rule historical? 
And, normatively, in what sense is historical accountability a corrective, 
ushering in liberalization?13  
In offering a historical description of transitional periods, Teitel’s 
introduction clearly describes the background history against which such periods 
are understood. The rhetorical choices of this passage reveal an historicist 
understanding of history that remains unexamined by Teitel and the field of 
transitional justice more generally. First, history is understood in terms of the “life 
of the state.”14 The state is the privileged actor of this history; the historical subject 
is the nation-state. Furthermore, the life of the state is normatively characterized 
by “its historical continuity.”15 Aside from the “historical glitches” presented by 
moments of “[w]ar[], revolutions and repressive rule,” the state persists in a 
historical temporality that is empty and homogenous in the sense that history is 
understood as a continuum along which individual states appear.16 Finally, this 
continuum is one that is structured along an axis of “liberalization”17 that supports 
a universalized narrative of progress which the moment of transition paradoxically 
interrupts and advances. 
As represented in this passage, the implicit theory of history that shapes the 
field of transitional justice has its own determinate history. Indeed, this particular 
conception of history has its own historical origins in the emergence of the 
modern European nation-state from the late eighteenth century to the early 
nineteenth century.18 It is an Enlightenment historicism that found its archetypical 
                                                 
12  RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 69 (2000). 
13  Id.  
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  See, for example, ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES (2d ed. 2004); see also PRASENJIT DUARA, 
RESCUING HISTORY FROM THE NATION-STATE (1995). 
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expression in G.W.F. Hegel’s Philosophy of World History.19 This historicist narrative 
provided the newly emergent liberal nation-states in Europe with the ideological 
appearance of a secure place in the structure of history as the necessary fulfillment 
of reason.20 In doing so, historicism imposed an ideological order on the history 
of the modern nation-state that was, in fact, produced by a series of bourgeois 
revolutions which were highly contested and uncertain. The ideological work of 
historicism within Western Europe not only secured the future of the nation-state, 
but also offered a justification for colonial rule when these nation-states projected 
their power beyond the confines of Europe.21 The historicist discourse inscribed 
the colonial state within its ambit, but it did so through the filter of what Homi 
Bhabha calls “mimicry . . . one of the most elusive and effective strategies of 
colonial power and knowledge.”22 The discourse of colonial mimicry represents 
the colonized subject as “almost the same, but not quite.”23 Consequently, the 
colonial state was conceived as similar enough to the nation-state to be included 
within the narrative arc of history, but not sufficiently like the European nation-
state to be the subject of history.  
The mimetic logic at work in historicism gave rise to the all-too-familiar 
civilizing mission of the white man’s burden.24 In this regard, international law 
worked closely with historicism. The operations of colonial mimicry are reflected 
in the legal status of the colonies in the major international legal instruments of 
the colonial period.25 The colonial signatories to the General Act of the 
Conference at Berlin of 1885, which set the legal groundwork for the scramble 
for Africa, pledged themselves “to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, 
and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material 
                                                 
19  See G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1975) (1830); see also LOUIS ALTHUSSER & ETIENNE BALIBAR, READING CAPITAL 93–96 (1997) 
(explaining how the Hegelian conception of historical time functions ideologically). 
20  The persistent ideological force of this narrative found vibrant expression at the end of the Cold 
War. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 55–70 (1992). 
21  See YOUNG, supra note 18, at 41-42. See also Edward Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, in ORIENTALISM: 
A READER 345, 355–56 (A.L. Macfie ed., 2000). 
22  HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 85 (1994). 
23  Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted). 
24  This phrase comes directly from the title of Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden: 
The United States and the Phillippine Islands,” which was written in 1899 to encourage the United 
States to join Britain and the rest of Europe in the project of empire. See RUDYARD KIPLING, 
KIPLING: POEMS 96 (Peter Washington ed., 2007). 
25  See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005). For an overview of this international legal history as it touches Africa in particular, see 
SIBA N’ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996). 
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well-being.”26 By suggesting a universal developmental path upon which the 
colonized peoples had only recently embarked, the use of the word 
“improvement” here already suggests the way in which the historicist vision of 
history had begun to structure the colonial imagination. The expressions of 
humanitarianism remained, however, little more than aspirational. With the end 
of the First World War, the international legal regime took a more systematic 
approach to the global colonial order. The underlying concern was to purge the 
colonial state of its monopolistic tendencies and to integrate a more economically 
liberalized set of relations.27 The result was Article XXII of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, which constructed a mandate system that seamlessly integrated 
the historicist narrative into its legal structures.28 Starting with the proposition that 
the colonies are “inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” the colonial powers committed 
themselves to “the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples 
form a sacred trust of civilisation.”29 In order to best effectuate this principle, the 
Covenant specified that “the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to 
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or 
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility” and that the 
“character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of 
the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, 
and other similar circumstances.”30 The legal justification for and the basic 
structures of colonialism clearly rest upon a historicist imagination that could not 
be more manifest. While the League of Nations was relatively short-lived, the 
historicist inclination of its colonial policy would live on in Article 73 of the United 
Nations Charter in which the colonial powers reiterated their self-appointed 
“sacred trust,” which included the obligation “to develop self-government, to take 
due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages 
of advancement.”31 
As a result of this juridical historicism, the law inscribed the colonial state 
within the international legal and political order, but only as a “partial subject” of 
                                                 
26  General Act of the Conference at Berlin art. 6, Feb. 26, 1885. For the history of the scramble for 
Africa, see GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA – VOLUME VII – AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL 
DOMINATION, 1880–1935 (A. Adu. Boahen ed., 1985). 
27  See, for example, GROVOGUI, supra note 25, at 126–30. 
28  League of Nations Covenant art. 22. 
29  Id.  
30  Id. 
31  U.N. Charter art. 73. 
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that order.32 The international legal order paradoxically asserted the need to deny 
colonial peoples the sovereign right of self-determination, the foundational 
principle of the international legal order, in order to advance the progressive legal 
development of an international regime that would be founded on precisely such 
a principle. In short, under the protocols of historicism, the rule of law suspended 
itself with respect to the colonies in the name of ensuring the possibility of the 
rule of law.  
This juridical structure of the law that authorizes its own suspension to 
preserve the law has been extensively theorized by Carl Schmitt and others as a 
“state of exception.”33 As succinctly put by Giorgio Agamben, in the state of 
exception, “the rule applies to the exception in no longer applying.”34 The 
historical basis for Schmitt and Agamben’s analyses, however, remains rooted in 
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution in inter-war Germany and Europe’s 
experience with National Socialism, rather than the colonial mandate system. 
Under Article 48, the executive power could declare a state of “emergency” or 
“exception,” which legally permitted the temporary suspension of specifically 
enumerated constitutional protections. When understood against the horizon of 
Germany’s particular constitutional framework and national history, the self-
suspension of the law where the law remains “in force but without significance” 
is necessarily understood precisely as an “exception,” for it is a horizon 
determined by historicism in every possible way.35  Agamben’s juridical reading of 
Nazism resonates with Teitel’s description of transitional justice, which has its 
historical and theoretical origins in the experience of and response to Nazism. 
Given these origins, theorists like Teitel have routinely conceptualized the 
“transition” of transitional justice as a “historical discontinuity,” a “gap,” and a 
“historical glitch.”36 Transitional justice is the other side of the state of exception.  
A difficulty, which is material as well as conceptual, arises when this state of 
exception, this process of legalized lawless transition, becomes the norm, as it was 
and continues to be in the colonial and postcolonial state. Unlike Nazi Germany, 
for example, where the experience of transition marks a violent interruption in the 
history of the modern democratic state, the colonial and postcolonial state has 
always been inscribed within a “transitional narrative” that characterized the 
                                                 
32  For a discussion of this “partial subject,” see BHABHA, supra note 22, at 86–87. 
33  See, for example, CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (2005); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (2005). 
34  GIORGIO AGAMBEN, POTENTIALITIES 162 (1999). 
35  Id. at 169–71; see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 51–
54 (1998). 
36  See TEITEL, supra note 12.  
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colonial state according to its perceived failures and alleged incompleteness.37 The 
resulting juridical status of the colonial state has led many scholars to recognize 
the colonial and postcolonial condition as being one that is formed under the state 
of exception. Achille Mbembe, for example, writes that “the colonies are the 
location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of the juridical order 
can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is 
deemed to operate in the service of ‘civilization.’” 38 The state of exception in the 
colony, however, was not a temporary interruption as it was in Germany or 
Argentina; rather, for the colonial state, the state of exception was the juridical 
norm. The colonial state always emerged in the international legal order as 
transitional. While ideologically conceived as transitional, the colonial state did not 
materially appear as only a temporary interruption in the historicist narrative 
because its arrival as a fully constituted, self-determining subject in the 
international legal order remained forever deferred. Thus, as transitional justice 
becomes increasingly engaged with the legal and political difficulties of post-
conflict societies in a postcolonial context, it becomes imperative to think the 
present transitions of so-called “failed states” or “post-conflict societies” as being 
embedded within the larger arc of this permanently suspended “transition” which 
has always characterized the colonial state.  
Overcoming the ideological narratives concerning decolonization remains a 
significant obstacle in responding to this task, since the story of decolonization is 
presented as the fulfillment of this transition toward a global and universal 
community of sovereign equals.39 As with all ideologies, this narrative captures a 
limited truth at the price of obscuring others. While decolonization did lead to a 
universal juridical equality of self-determining nation-states, the formalism of this 
equality did not address the substantive inequalities that persisted and which were 
analyzed according to a developmentalist framework that was little more than a 
reiteration of the transitional logic of historicism.40 From this perspective, the 
transitional state of exception remains as persistent as ever. Such a situation 
necessarily confronts the limitations of transitional justice’s tendency toward a 
historicism that inevitably conceives the self-disavowal of the law in terms of an 
                                                 
37  See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND 
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 30–34 (2000). 
38  Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUBLIC CULTURE 11 (2003). A diverse range of scholars have also 
begun to use “the state of exception” as a theoretical basis of examining the war on terror and what 
some perceive to be its neo-imperial character. See, for example, Christopher L. Kutz, Torture, Necessity 
and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235 (2007); MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, 
MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE (2004). 
39  See ANGHIE, supra note 25, at 197.  
40  See Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality of International Law, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 464–65 (2005). 
See also BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND THE THIRD WORLD (2003). 
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exception and as a temporary interruption in the historical march of liberalization. 
As we have seen, this notion of a historical discontinuity in the colonized nation 
has its own determinate history rooted in the ideology of imperialism. The 
difficulty, therefore, becomes one of understanding how the historicity of this 
continual historical discontinuity characteristic of (post)coloniality is experienced 
by the subjects who live it and what conception of history can take account of this 
experience. These are serious and fundamental historical questions with which 
transitional justice must come to terms if it is to do justice to the realities of the 
historical experience currently being lived in so many different ways across sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. 
III.  EXPANDING THE ECOLOGICAL SCOPE OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE  
In place of classic historicism then, transitional justice must develop a 
historical imagination which comprehends, in the words of Achille Mbembe, “the 
peculiar ‘historicity’ of African societies, their own raisons d’être and their relation 
to solely themselves, are rooted in a multiplicity of times, trajectories, and 
rationalities that, although particular and sometimes local, cannot be 
conceptualized outside a world that is, so to speak, globalized.”41 Mbembe’s 
articulation of a new conception of African historicity resonates with Walter 
Benjamin’s own project of historical materialism, which recognized that “the ‘state 
of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule” and which 
acknowledged the need to arrive at a concept of history that corresponds to this 
fact.42 For Benjamin, the historical object that constitutes the kernel of historical 
materialism is the “dialectical image”43 that explodes “the continuum of historical 
succession.”44 The dialectical image emerges as the object of historical materialism 
from the confrontation of the present moment with one from the past.45 This 
juxtaposition of moments produces an object of historical inquiry that disrupts, 
arrests, and stalls the smooth operation of the historicist narrative. The 
                                                 
41  ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY 9 (2001). 
42  WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 257 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1969). 
43  Id. at 257. 
44  WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ARCADES PROJECT 475 (Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin trans., 
1999). See also Walter Benjamin, Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT 
SCHOOL READER 225, 226–27 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., Continuum Publ’g. Co. 1982) 
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relationship between the moments is not temporal, but, to use Benjamin’s term, 
bildlich, which is to say “figural” in a structural sense.46 The African “failed state” 
finds its dialectical image in the colonial state. The material historical connection 
between the colonial and postcolonial moment is not reducible to the temporal 
continuum of historicist progress toward democratic self-determination; rather, it 
is a structural continuity that rests upon a certain (post)colonial configuration of 
power.  
As the case study on Sierra Leone in Part IV will show, the current social 
conditions in postcolonial Africa are the result of a historical conjuncture of the 
international political economy, shaped by an uneven distribution of power, the 
doctrinal strictures of the current international legal regime, and the unregulated 
character of transnational commerce. Insofar as transitional justice aims to address 
the underlying social conditions that have led a given country to its current 
“transitional” moment, the field needs to develop theoretical and practical means 
of addressing the various forces and actors that lie beyond and beneath the nation-
state. However, the current state of international legal doctrine places many such 
actors beyond the reach of any legal institution. Transitional justice needs to 
conceive of its project beyond the present doctrinal limitations of law within 
which it must necessarily operate.  
Thinking outside the parameters of historicism is central to this task, as even 
the most cursory survey of the colonial relation in international law shows that the 
ideological limits of legal doctrine and historicist thought are mutually 
constitutive. In the field of law, the historicist limitations of the political 
unconscious47 have their material expression in the form of legal doctrines that 
constrain the legal imagination by focusing attention on the state and local actors 
and away from various international organizations and other transnational actors. 
Truth commissions play an important role here, and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for Sierra Leone (TRCSL) has produced a report that is exemplary 
in at least two ways. First, as already mentioned, the TRCSL Report included a 
discussion of the country’s colonial history with a view towards marking its 
continuing legacy in Sierra Leonean society.48 Second, the TRCSL Report took a 
broad view of its mandate to investigate “human rights violations and abuses” by 
considering the possibility that transnational corporations and private security 
organizations could contravene human rights norms just as well as state actors.49 
                                                 
46  BENJAMIN, THE ARCADES PROJECT, supra note 44, at 463. 
47  See generally FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS (1982). 
48  See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 8.  
49  See William A. Schabas, The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
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By drawing attention to various “international” actors in these transitional 
situations, the intention is not to diminish the responsibility and agency of the 
more “local” actors involved in the events which have precipitated the transition. 
First, the dichotomy between “local” and “international,” which tends to shape 
the analytical imagination, especially as it relates to Africa, in such a way that the 
African actors are identified with the “local” and the Western actors with the 
“international,” is itself one of the imaginative effects of historicism that needs to 
be overcome. Of course, on a certain level, the African parties are deemed “local” 
simply because they are socially situated on the ground of the relevant events. 
Nevertheless, this dichotomous view can easily lead to more structural 
misperceptions of the complexity of the situation. Given the configuration of 
power in postcolonial Africa, the “local” actors in Africa are still significant players 
in the various international networks that are informing the region. As Mbembe 
emphasizes, the local in Africa can no longer be conceptualized in isolation from 
the international networks within which it has been historically intertwined.50 
While the analytical mapping of the local and the international undoubtedly 
corresponds to the state of dependency that characterizes postcolonial Africa, 
there can be no doubt that “Africa may have played an active role throughout this 
long process of reduction to a state of dependency.”51  
Recognizing that Africans have been responsible actors in these processes 
does not broach, however, the profoundly difficult problem of how that agency 
is to be understood when the larger society operates in a state of domination.52 
The problem becomes even more acute when it arises against the backdrop of 
questions of criminal justice. Indeed, as Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni argue, 
international criminal law individualizes and localizes criminal responsibility in a 
manner that systematically obscures the global social and economic forces that 
structure and generate violent conflicts across the Global South.53 Insofar as this 
problem has already been resolved by the academic literature and the criminal 
tribunals against the “local” figures, the present objective is to find ways in which 
the responsibility of the “international” actors may be conceptualized, as both a 
historical and a legal matter. Even the most historically informed investigations 
into the recent civil war in Sierra Leone tend to present an account that merely 
gestures towards the colonial period and begins in earnest with the various frailties 
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Ellis trans., 2000). 
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of the newly independent state.54 Such a truncated approach to history, however, 
inevitably results in a focus on the local actors.55 In short, the emphasis is on the 
African actors as the cause of their own problems. Of course, a rigorous 
examination of more temporally recent causes is needed, and may even be 
necessary, before the colonial legacy can be addressed. At the same time, however, 
historicist logic ironically encourages this ahistorical and unifocal concern with the 
postcolonial state in isolation from the historical international networks of power 
within which it operates. These international networks would be harder to ignore 
if the colonial legacy were a more significant feature of these analyses.  
The hegemonic discourse of both law and history, therefore, concentrate 
responsibility upon actors who have been historically sentenced to a situation that 
is largely not of their own making. Moreover, such narratives downplay the extent 
to which various Western and non-governmental actors continue to exert a 
tremendous amount of influence in the region.56 Similarly, criminal tribunals such 
as the Special Court for Sierra Leone have managed to exercise jurisdiction over 
local actors including Charles Taylor, the rebel leaders of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), as well as leaders of both the Armed Forced Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) and the pro-government Civil Defense Force (CDF). On the other hand, 
largely due to the doctrinal limitations of international law, as well as the realities 
of international politics, the various international actors which arguably bear some 
responsibility remain beyond the reach of such tribunals. In the case of Sierra 
Leone, the point of course is not that Charles Taylor or the RUF should not be 
tried, but that transitional justice should also begin imagining ways that 
“international” actors can be held accountable. 
This vision of a transitional justice that encompasses actors on all levels 
extends the movement toward an “ecological model” of transitional justice.57 The 
development of an ecological approach to transitional justice articulates a 
systematic attempt to move beyond the tendency to view criminal tribunals and 
truth commissions as diametrically opposed mechanisms for overcoming past 
atrocities and effecting the necessary social repair.58 At its root, the ecological 
model stems from the fundamental recognition that societies are complex systems 
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and that “change in one part of the system causes reaction throughout.”59 An 
ecological model of transitional justice, therefore, “considers all the players and 
social institutions.”60  When situated within the tribunal versus truth commission 
debate, for example, an ecological model of social repair demands that organized 
efforts at transitional justice contend with complex social systems wherein 
“[p]rosecutions without a forum where a larger narrative could emerge create[ ] a 
partial, fortuitous view of history (dependent on evidence and the ability to 
apprehend defendants) while a truth commission without a tie to judicial actions 
against perpetrators begs the question of what the consequence of truth should 
be.”61  Moreover, this multiplicity of interactions between numerous players 
extends across the entire process of social breakdown and repair within which 
transitional justice takes place. In Fletcher and Weinstein’s model, transitional 
justice work begins at the third stage of a process of social breakdown—the stage 
of peaceful cessation of violence, which frequently is “when the international 
community becomes engaged actively.”62 While it is true that the sector of the 
international community of which transitional justice is a part becomes involved 
at this stage of the process, numerous other members of the international 
community frequently play significant roles at every stage of the process, including 
the earlier stages of social breakdown and mass violence.63 Consequently, an 
ecological approach to transitional justice requires that international interventions 
in the form of transitional justice take account of the international community’s 
involvement at earlier stages of the process. 
An important realization of the ecological model has been that 
internationally organized transitional justice efforts are frequently situated “in 
post-conflict societies where external interventions, such as trials or development 
schemes or democratization, may be perceived as being imposed by outsiders and 
not of intrinsic worth.”64 Such perceptions are fueled both by the colonial history 
of such external interventions and their continued role in the processes of social 
breakdown behind the conflict. In refusing to acknowledge these dynamics, “the 
international community often exaggerates its ability to contribute to stability and 
a durable peace.”65 Consequently, the ecological approach to transitional justice 
work speaks of “the need for post-war communities to define and take ownership 
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of the processes of justice and reconciliation.”66 Such a call resonates with the 
widespread notion that transitional justice mechanisms, whether tribunals or 
commissions, must eliminate the “culture of impunity” which is seen as 
characterizing the transitional society.67  
The concern with eliminating a culture of impunity has permeated a variety 
of international organizations. The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), for instance, expresses the ICC’s 
determination “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of “grave crimes 
[that] threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the world.”68 Similarly, various 
organs of the U.N. have adopted a rhetoric that voices the need to end a “culture 
of impunity” within the national political culture of any given number of states.69 
Given this concern and the need to recognize the limitations of external 
interventions, one of the most effective steps the international community could 
take in advancing peace and reconciliation in post-conflict societies may well be a 
more concerted effort to bring to an end the culture of impunity within the 
international community at large. An expanded ecological approach to transitional 
justice, one which conscientiously attends to the role of international 
organizations and transnational actors in the processes of social breakdown, 
would promote an international rule of law equal to the transnational networks of 
power that characterize the contemporary international order.70 
IV.  THE DIALECTICAL IMAGE OF SIERRA LEONE AS 
POSTCOLONY :  A  BRIEF CASE STUDY  
In keeping with an ecological approach, transitional justice in so-called 
“failed states” must consider not only the internal causes of social breakdown 
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within these states, but must also consider how these internal factors are 
themselves integrated into a set of globalized relations involving a number of 
international organizations and transnational actors. Far too frequently, academic 
analyses of “failed states” in Africa focus exclusively on the political culture and 
economic policies of these states, ignoring the multiple ways in which the 
international community has failed them.71 By treating the causes of social 
breakdown in complete isolation from the international networks within which 
African states are deeply imbricated, these analyses function as modern iterations 
of the historicist colonial notion that “Africa has remained cut off from all 
contacts with the rest of the world.”72  The neo-colonialist policy implications of 
such views of the “failed state” appeared quite explicitly in various calls on the 
political right after 9/11 for the creation of a new “colonial office” or a new 
mandate system.73  A brief overview of the structure of colonial rule reveals that 
such calls do not merely express a revived imperialist fantasy on the part of neo-
conservatives, but reflect the ways in which the structures of colonial rule are 
reproducing and reconfiguring themselves in our contemporary era. The creation 
of “failed states” and the concomitant need for the international community to 
intervene are integral parts of this ongoing historical process. Consequently, if 
transitional justice hopes to reconstruct these societies in ways that will prevent 
the recurrence of atrocities and human rights violations, then it must search for 
ways to intercede in this process—which means that the relevant members of the 
international community need to be held equally accountable for their respective 
roles. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, the legacy of colonial rule established the basic 
framework for a colonial figure of governmentality that has persisted today in the 
form of what William Reno has called the “Shadow State.”74 According to Reno, 
the basic structures of this Shadow State determined the social, political, and 
economic dynamics behind the post-independence social breakdown and the 
ensuing civil war from 1991 to 2002.75 As with most British colonies in Africa, the 
British pursued a policy of “indirect rule,” which received its most systematic 
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exposition in The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa by John Frederick Lugard, the 
governor-general of Nigeria from 1914 to 1919. In rough outline, the British 
system of indirect rule centered colonial administration in the district 
commissioner who oversaw and directed the implementation of colonial policy by 
those paramount chiefs whom the British had chosen as their middlemen and who 
reported directly to the district commissioner.76 Lugard’s express rationale for 
indirect rule unsurprisingly integrated the kind of historicist logic that underwrote 
the entirety of the European colonial project. Emphasizing the need for 
“cooperation between every link in the chain” of colonial command, Lugard 
explained that:  
the task of the administrative officer is to clothe his principles in the garb of 
evolution, not of revolution; to make it apparent alike to the educated native, 
the conservative Moslem, and the primitive pagan, each in his own degree, 
that the policy of the government is not antagonistic but progressive—
sympathetic to his aspirations and the guardian of his natural rights.77  
While Lugard’s doctrinal work was not published until 1922, the general 
outlines of indirect rule had long been an organizing principle of British colonial 
administration, and its adoption was as much a matter of military, political, and 
economic pragmatism as it was one of liberal progressivism.78 Even before the 
official declaration of the Protectorate in 1896, which brought the territories of 
Sierra Leone’s hinterland under the control of British Administration centered in 
Freetown, the course of colonial expansion spurred by the scramble for Africa 
proceeded as a series of proxy wars between the British and the French in which 
the colonial powers made alliances with indigenous leaders, who in turn played 
the colonial powers off of each other in a sustained effort to maintain their own 
power.79  
One of the more interesting figures of this period—and certainly the most 
powerful African ruler in the region—was Samori Ture who, with the assistance 
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of European arms obtained through trade with Freetown, had created an 
extensive empire by 1881 that covered parts of modern Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
Liberia, Mali, and the Ivory Coast.80  Both the French and the British at various 
times entered into alliances with Samori in the attempt to secure his cooperation 
in their respective maneuverings against each other, while Samori deftly played the 
Europeans against each other. By 1890, the European powers realized the 
difficulties presented by African rulers armed with modern weapons; so, as part 
of the Brussels Act of 1890, the colonial powers agreed to restrict the arms trade 
in Africa.81 After some initial resistance from the British Colonial Office, since 
Samori was generally on the side of the British at this time, the terms of the 
agreement were eventually put into effect in Sierra Leone by an ordinance in 
1892.82 Displeased by this change in policy and fearing the loss of trade access 
secured by Samori, Alfred Jones, the owner of the Sierra Leone Coaling Company, 
began to supply arms directly to Samori. In return, Samori granted Jones the right 
to build roads and railways in the region as well as levy taxes. The arrangement 
was relatively short-lived, however, as the British Colonial Office soon cracked 
down on Jones’s arms trading, and Samori was eventually captured by the French 
in 1898.83  
During the colonial period, most of the local African rulers did not have the 
unusual military and political might of Samori. Consequently, once the regional 
disputes between the English and the French over territory settled down, the 
British strategy of creating alliances with local African rulers created a political 
culture in which the colonial state relied upon so-called paramount chiefs to locally 
administer colonial policy, while the chiefs in turn depended upon the British to 
exercise power. The dynamics of this arrangement were consolidated in the 
aftermath of the Hut Tax War of 1898.84 In an effort to secure colonial 
administration in the Protectorate and raise revenues, the British levied a house 
tax on the inhabitants. The collection of the tax required the cooperation of the 
chiefs who, in return for their efforts, would receive a portion of the revenues 
raised. Many chiefs recognized the new tax for what it was: an organized attempt 
to integrate them into the colonial administration as subordinate intermediaries 
who would carry out the colonial policies of the British. Consequently, an alliance 
of Temne and Mende chiefs rose in rebellion against the British authorities under 
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the leadership of Bai Bureh.85 The uprising was eventually quelled, but only after 
intense and prolonged fighting which required the British to bring in two 
companies of troops from Lagos when the insurrectionaries had arrived within 40 
kilometers of Freetown.86  
Not all the chiefs had participated in the rebellion, however, and the British 
rewarded the chiefs who remained loyal while making examples of those who had 
not. As part of the new arrangements, the loyal chiefs received arms, unobtainable 
on the free market, in order to keep insurgent groups under control and to 
maintain open trade routes. The result was an uneasy truce between the British, 
who relied upon a system of concessions to the chiefs in order to maintain relative 
stability, and the chiefs, who were increasingly able to translate their military and 
political concessions into forms of economic activity that increasingly operated 
outside the state-sanctioned economy. While the British gradually became aware 
of and concerned about this parallel economic activity, fear of another rebellion 
and fiscal limitations meant that such activities were tolerated, if not officially 
sanctioned.87 
At the end of it all, a new colonial order had emerged within Sierra Leone, 
one where “[a]ccess to state power translated into private benefit” for the 
subservient chief and whose basic structures would persist, with various 
adjustments, until the present day.88 Numerous academics have developed slightly 
different formulations of the governmentality that operates in the historical wake 
of indirect rule.89 Jean-François Bayart, for example, writes of the “dual structures 
of power” characteristic of what he calls the “post-colonial rhizome state.”90 
According to Bayart, “African political societies are duplicated between, on the 
one hand, a pays légal, a legal structure which is the focus of attention for 
multilateral donors and Western states, and on the other hand, a pays réel where 
real power is wielded.”91  Similarly, Achille Mbembe has elaborated the structures 
of “Private Indirect Government,” where “functions supposed to be public, and 
obligations that flow from sovereignty, are increasingly performed by private 
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operators for private ends.”92  In the specific context of Sierra Leone, William 
Reno writes of a “Shadow State” where rulers emerge and consolidate power 
based on the ability to control informal markets and distribute their material 
benefits.93 For all their differences, these analyses uniformly present an image of 
postcolonial governance in Africa where, with the official end of indirect rule and 
decolonization, the configuration of indirect rule has in effect been displaced to a 
higher level of the international system. As a formal matter, the postcolonial state 
apparatus occupies the structural position formerly held by the paramount chiefs, 
and the centralized authority of the former colonial government has been 
dispersed among a variety of international organizations and transnational actors. 
As a practical matter, given the decentralized character of how power is exercised 
in the contemporary global order, the framework of this neocolonial 
governmentality has become vastly subtler than its historical counterpart, and the 
central organizing principle is no longer that of state sovereignty but the exigencies 
of the market. 
The political economy in the African postcolony, however, is rooted in a 
network of social relations of production and accumulation that remain, 
paradoxically perhaps, both the product of colonial rule and obscure to the 
colonialists’ contemporary heirs. The Westphalian system of international 
governance requires that there be a sovereign state to mediate between the sphere 
of public international law and the sphere of private financial interest. Colonialism, 
however, bequeathed to this system a postcolonial state where, as with the 
paramount chiefs before it, power is exercised through controlling access to 
markets and distributing its benefits, all in ways which effectively make the 
boundaries between state and society, public and private, extremely porous. In 
response, therefore, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impose conditionalities on the 
postcolonial African state which are intended to bring about a more rigid 
separation of these spheres. Such measures inevitably weaken the state, however, 
and only encourage the growth of informal markets that circumvent the state and 
which become the new channels through which power is distributed. From the 
perspective of the international community, however, the proliferation of these 
alternative networks appear precisely as the sign that more such reforms are 
needed. Thus, the vicious circle is enjoined.  
The history of Sierra Leone since the days of British rule can be understood 
as so many turns in this widening gyre, with the Civil War of 1991–2002 being 
only the latest, if most devastating, turn. Throughout the 1980s, the government 
of Sierra Leone, like so many others, embarked on a series of “structural 
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adjustment programs” under pressure from a variety of IFIs. These 
conditionalities secured credit for the government, but they also increased 
unemployment and inflation, while generating a large amount of political 
dissatisfaction and instability.94 In 1987, the World Bank blocked payment of 
future loans due to Sierra Leone’s failure to make its scheduled payments to the 
IMF. The government had fallen into arrears after the head of the Israeli mining 
company, previously given monopoly rights to diamond mining, was extradited 
from the United States, where he faced charges of fraud, to Israel to face counts 
of selling state secrets to South Africa.95 The state economy collapsed.96 The 
informal markets, especially in diamonds, flourished. In order to get back into the 
good graces of the IMF, President Momoh sought once again to privatize the 
exploitation of diamonds. By 1990 the government entered into an agreement 
with Sunshine Broulle, a company from Dallas, Texas, which insisted that the 
government use military force to remove illicit miners from the diamond mines in 
Kono. The government swiftly obliged, and Operation Clean Slate was soon 
launched. This maneuver was ultimately a failure, however, as many of the 
soldiers, who were economically distressed and politically disaffected like the rest 
of the population, began mining themselves.97  
Meanwhile, in neighboring Liberia, Charles Taylor, with financial and other 
material assistance from a number of transnational corporations, was in the midst 
of creating the parallel state of “Greater Liberia,” which aimed to include the 
diamond-producing district of Kono in Sierra Leone.98 While no state had 
recognized the legitimacy of Charles Taylor’s government, a number of 
transnational corporations made agreements with him which included tax 
payments and other concessions in exchange for access to iron ore, timber, and 
rubber. Firestone Tire and Rubber, for instance, provided Taylor with 
communications facilities and an operational base on its rubber plantation in 
exchange for continued rubber production, while the British-owned African 
Mining Company of Liberia paid Taylor hefty concessions for access to iron ore.99 
With this support, Charles Taylor encouraged and aided Foday Sankoh, the leader 
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of the RUF, who in turn waged an insurgent military campaign against the 
government of Sierra Leone. The civil war had begun. The RUF had the upper 
hand throughout much of the fighting and arrived within 20 miles of Freetown 
by May 1995. However, the tide turned against the RUF when the government 
hired the South African private military firm Executive Outcomes (EO) to lead 
its defensive operations. Since the government could not adequately pay for EO’s 
services directly, the government granted mining rights to EO’s corporate 
relatives Branch Energy and Diamond Works—rights which are still the basis for 
the current mining operations of Koidu Holdings Limited.100 From this point on, 
the conflict in Sierra Leone witnessed the emergence of various factions and 
interests, none of which aligned in a manner consistent with traditional views of 
civil war. Eventually, however, the retreating RUF and the government would 
enter into the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999 with considerable assistance from 
the international community, including a United Nations peacekeeping operation, 
although the war would not end until peaceful elections were held in 2002 under 
the auspices of the international community.101 
As this brief outline of Sierra Leone’s recent history suggests, various sectors 
of the international community have been intricately involved both in the social 
processes that have led to the social breakdown behind the war and in the conduct 
of the war itself. The structural adjustment programs created by the IFIs place 
increasing pressure on governments to privatize various sectors of social 
production and organization. As a result, the government hands over power and 
control over to foreign corporations who end up in charge of everything from the 
principal economic sectors of the country to its military forces. The result is not 
simply a “failed state,” but “the establishment of a different political economy and 
the invention of new systems of coercion and exploitation.”102 As new as it might 
be, however, this new system has profound structural similarities to the 
colonialism of old. Like the paramount chiefs before them, rulers in the 
postcolony act as intermediaries who lend various forms of political and legal 
legitimacy to a system of foreign domination and exploitation whose interests 
nicely align with those of the governmental leaders. And while today’s leaders in 
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Africa, like the paramount chiefs, are complicit in the development of this system, 
they do not act alone. Just as the corruption of the colonial system could neither 
be attributed to the paramount chiefs alone nor be redeemed by the best 
intentions of its civilizing mission, the corruption at the heart of the new structures 
of governance in the postcolony can neither be laid solely at the feet of local 
governments nor rectified by the humanitarian intentions of some within the 
international community without developing mechanisms for holding non-state 
actors accountable for their part in the new regime of global control. 
V.  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
TRANSNATIONAL  CORPORATIONS 
The linchpin of this new global order is arguably corporate impunity. An 
expanded ecological approach to transitional justice that addresses corporate 
actors can play a strategic part in altering the governance structures of the 
postcolony. Situated as it is in moments of reflection concerning the fate of post-
conflict societies, transitional justice has the chance to promote, if pursued from 
a properly internationalist perspective, the development of a more acute 
consciousness within the international community concerning the neocolonialist 
forces at work within its own structures of governance. As the Sierra Leone case 
aptly demonstrates, the field of transitional justice directly confronts the 
governance structures of the postcolony, the role that businesses play in the 
regime, and the humanitarian consequences of the fundamental lack of 
accountability for non-state actors. Consequently, transitional justice is well 
positioned to advance the development of legal mechanisms for corporate 
accountability, and it should integrate focused attention on corporate 
accountability into its fundamental framework. Unsurprisingly, from its very 
inception, the postcolonial world has been acutely aware of the governance role 
of business in the global order and the need to hold transnational corporations 
accountable. Formerly colonized and developing nations have taken the lead in 
creating an international legal regime of corporate accountability. This movement 
continues and is gathering momentum. Transitional justice can make meaningful 
contributions to this effort, while simultaneously advancing its core objectives of 
creating a historical record regarding past atrocities, advancing justice and 
reparations for victims, and instituting governance reforms. 
A.  The Modern History of Corporate Accountabili ty for 
Human Rights 
The role of transnational corporations in postcolonial governance has long 
been recognized, and modern attempts to find legal mechanisms for holding 
transnational corporations accountable for human rights violations reach back to 
the very beginnings of the postcolony. Myriad institutional attempts at 
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international regulation of transnational corporations have proliferated since the 
end of the Second World War.103 Initial efforts, such as the failed International 
Trade Organization, were concerned primarily with curtailing and regulating 
restrictive business practices that would adversely affect international markets.104 
During the 1970s, following the initiative of the Group of 77 (G77), which was a 
coalition of the world's developing nations, most of whom were recently 
decolonized, the movement toward legally regulating corporate conduct gained 
new momentum, this time with a view toward curbing behavior that adversely 
affected developing nations.105 The G77 found an effective forum within the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and in December 1974, ECOSOC 
created the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC).106 This move 
was just one of the numerous proposals that the G77 put forth as part of the New 
International Economic Order,107 which began to bring the newly globalized 
structures of the international political economy into focus. The scope of the 
UNCTC's concern was outlined by the study Multinational Corporations in World 
Development, which addressed such issues as host state sovereignty, development, 
labor, and direct foreign investment.108 By 1976, the UNCTC had begun work on 
drafting an international code of conduct that would have been binding on 
transnational corporations. This effort continued over the course of the next 15 
years and draft codes were produced in 1983 and in 1990.109  The central thrust of 
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the codes was that corporations were to comply with the domestic regulations of 
the host country and to not interfere with the host countries’ domestic policies. 
However, the UNCTC Code of Conduct never went very far. As can easily 
be imagined, the UNCTC's efforts were fiercely resisted by the developed nations, 
who were, and continue to be, the home states to the transnational corporations. 
In addition to opposition within the U.N. itself, the UNCTC faced competition 
within the quickly growing sphere of global civil society. In 1977, the Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), whose membership 
represents the majority of the world's developed nations as a historical bloc, had 
passed the Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises, which outlined a voluntary set of principles and standards for business 
conduct.110 These voluntary standards would be periodically renewed until 2000, 
and they would serve as the guiding force behind the development of the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement.  
By 1990, the UNCTC issued a report entitled The New Code Environment 
describing this polarized political environment forged in the geopolitics of the 
Cold War.111 In an attempt to overcome the persistent political opposition to the 
code, the UNCTC abandoned the idea of a legally binding code and suggested 
that the Code “be adopted as a voluntary instrument.”112 The end of the Cold 
War, however, also meant the end of the UNCTC, which lost its independent 
status within the U.N. in 1993 and was turned into the Commission of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).113 
In keeping with the ideological character of the Cold War, these earlier 
attempts at regulating transnational corporations were situated primarily on socio-
economic terrain. While human rights were an occasional issue within the 
UNCTC, they became so only insofar as they intersected with the Commission's 
larger concern with economic growth in developing countries. With the end of 
the Cold War and the triumph of neoliberal capitalism, the political conditions for 
a New International Economic Order seemed to have collapsed. The ensuing 
decade could be characterized as an “interregnum,” extending from the end of the 
Cold War in 1989 to the protests in 1999 at the World Trade Organization's 
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Ministerial Conference in Seattle.114 With the protests in Seattle, globalization 
emerged as the catalyst for a newly articulated confrontation, and correspondingly 
new alliances were forged.115 Globalization now asserted itself as the stage on 
which the former struggles of decolonization would be recast and reformed. 
Within this new order, human rights provided a critical discursive terrain on which 
the politics of international relations would henceforth be engaged.116 
These changes can be seen in the revival of the debate concerning 
international legal regulation of transnational corporations. While the UNCTC 
was dissolved in 1993, and its code abandoned, the political desire to impose some 
international legal standards on transnational corporations did not dissipate, and 
the effort to do so was soon revived—this time under the auspices of what would 
soon become the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (the Sub-Commission).117 In 1998, the Sub-Commission approved 
a “Transnational Corporations Working Group,” which was to last for three years 
(the Working Group). The Sub-Commission was given a mandate to “identify and 
examine the effects of the working methods and activities of transnational 
corporations on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the 
right to development, as well as civil and political rights.”118 Quite soon, the 
Working Group was hearing calls from various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) for the Group to draft “a code of conduct to regulate transnational 
corporations.”119 In response, the Sub-Commission renewed the Working 
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Group's mandate in 2001, and this time it was charged with the task of analyzing 
“the possibility of establishing a monitoring mechanism in order to apply 
sanctions and obtain compensation for infringements committed and damage 
caused by transnational corporations, and contribute to the drafting of binding 
norms for that purpose.”120 The final result were the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
(Draft Norms).121 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in global civil society, the private sector sensed the 
shifting political terrain. A new approach was needed, and the opportunity for one 
presented itself at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 
31, 1999. Addressing himself directly to the “business leaders gathered in Davos,” 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed that the U.N. and the private sector 
“initiate a global compact of shared values and principles, which will give a human 
face to the global market.”122 A number of different dynamics moved just beneath 
the surface of Annan's proposal, which clearly took the form of a bargain between 
the public and private actors of the international community. Such a compact was 
needed, Annan suggested, because the increasing global resistance to 
globalization—which would soon climax in Seattle—posed a threat to the stability 
of international markets. The solution to the problem lay in “a set of core values 
in the areas of human rights, labour standards, and environmental practices.”123 
Annan asked the business leaders gathered at Davos to “encourage States to give 
us, the multilateral institutions of which they are all members, the resources and 
the authority we need to do our job.”124 When Annan became secretary-general, 
the U.N. budget was in crisis, in part because the U.S. owed the institution $1.6 
billion dollars and the U.S. Congress had just lowered the American assessment 
for the U.N. budget from twenty-five to twenty-two percent.125 In exchange for 
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businesses’ help in persuading governments to support the mission of the U.N., 
Annan told the business leaders that the U.N., with all of its various institutional 
capacities, could help “in incorporating these agreed upon values and principles 
into your mission statements and corporate practices.”126 The business sector took 
the offer and created the Global Compact.  
Officially launched on July 26, 2000 in New York at the U.N. Headquarters 
by the secretary-general, the Global Compact now has over 13,000 corporate 
participants.127 The Global Compact has isolated ten fundamental principles 
which members of the Compact commit themselves to advancing. Related to 
human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption, these principles are 
drawn from international instruments and declarations. The Global Compact is 
an entirely voluntary program—the principles are in no way binding upon the 
member corporations. Rather, corporations commit themselves to embedding 
these principles into their business practices and to filing annual reports with the 
Global Compact, which outline what steps they have taken toward advancing the 
principles. While the Compact has no mechanism for auditing or otherwise 
verifying the information in the reports, it has delisted corporations for failing to 
file reports.128 Through these procedures, the Global Compact hopes to meet the 
U.N.’s stated objective of “embedding the global market in a network of shared 
values.”129 As such, the theory behind the Global Compact, already legible in Kofi 
Annan's speech at Davos, stems directly from the work of John Ruggie, whom 
Annan had appointed as assistant secretary-general and senior adviser for strategic 
planning in 1997. As Annan’s speech makes clear, the guiding principle behind 
the Global Compact is Ruggie's notion of “embedded liberalism” which he had 
initially developed in 1982.130 In short, embedded liberalism describes the social 
compromise reached after the Second World War in which the insecurities 
associated with an international and multilateral market regime would be offset by 
accepting various domestic interventions in the economy.131 In other words, 
international market forces would be embedded in a set of domestic social, 
political, and legal restraints. The idea behind the Global Compact is that a similar 
social compact is now needed on an international level and that corporate 
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engagement with the relevant international institutions is therefore required to 
make that happen.132 
When the Draft Norms reached the larger U.N. community in 2003, the 
political environment had been altered by the advent of the Global Compact. By 
the time the Draft Norms reached the Commission on Human Rights, opposition 
to them was intense, with the historically opposed blocs once again engaged.133 
On the one side was the international business community, led by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organization of 
Employers (IOE),134 and the national governments of the U.S., the U.K., and 
Australia. On the other side were academics, activists and NGOs, who voiced 
their support of the Draft Norms to the Commission in a joint oral statement with 
194 adherents.135 Sensing the intensity of the impending debate, the Commission 
distanced itself from the Draft Norms by declaring that they had “not been 
requested by the Commission” and directed the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) to meet with the relevant stakeholders in the debate 
and to produce a report of its findings.136  
Accordingly, the OHCHR, in cooperation with the Global Compact, 
convened a two-day workshop regarding the Norms in October 2004, which was 
attended by a number of stakeholders, and published a report detailing the results 
in February 2005.137 As before, the salient point of contention was whether the 
human rights obligations should be directly binding upon corporations.138 Taking 
heed of the intense opposition generated by the Draft Norms, especially by the 
private sector and the U.S., the U.N. Commission on Human Rights requested 
that the Secretary-General “appoint a special representative on the issue of human 
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rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”139 Both the 
U.S. and Australia voted against the resolution, while South Africa abstained.140 In 
explaining the U.S.’s opposition to the resolution, Leonard Leo, the U.S. delegate 
to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, stated that “the resolution before us 
takes a negative tone towards international and national businesses, treating them 
as potential problems rather than the overwhelmingly positive forces for 
economic development and human rights that they are.”141 In a gesture that 
profoundly underscored the historical weight of the U.S.’s position, Leo went on 
to bemoan the fact that “[w]e have been down this path many times in the U.N.” 
and remarked that “it is both sad and undeniable that the anti-business agenda 
pursued by many in this organization over the years has held back the economic 
and social advancement of developing countries.”142  The alliance between 
multinational business interests and the U.S. in opposition to an international 
regulatory regime for transnational corporations could not be more clearly 
manifest. 
Following the Commission's recommendation, the Secretary-General 
designated a Special Representative (SRSG) to further investigate the issue. The 
man appointed to the job was none other than John Ruggie. On February 22, 
2006, Ruggie submitted his Interim Report.143 After reviewing the relevant issues, 
the Interim Report turned to the subject of the Draft Norms and flatly declared 
that “the Norms exercise became engulfed in its own doctrinal excesses.”144 In 
particular, the Interim Report focused on two doctrinal issues. First, the Interim 
Report questioned the legal ground on which the Draft Norms suggested that 
human rights norms could be directly binding upon corporations.145 Second, the 
Interim Report suggested that, in making some human rights binding upon 
corporations, the Draft Norms articulated no sound legal principle according to 
which responsibilities for human violations would be allocated between states and 
corporations.146 With this assessment, the Draft Norms were dead. In charting the 
way forward, the Interim Report advocated a “principled pragmatism” and 
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suggested that “one critical area of legal standards that merits close attention is 
the possible extension in the extraterritorial application of some home countries’ 
jurisdiction for the worst human rights abuses committed by their firms 
abroad.”147 
In June 2008, John Ruggie presented his final report, entitled Protect, Respect 
& Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (the “Ruggie Report”), to the 
U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC).148 The Ruggie Report proposed a “policy 
framework to anchor the business and human rights debate,” which was organized 
around three basic pillars: “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses 
by third parties; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need 
for more effective access to remedies.”149  This tripartite structure of “protect, 
respect, and remedy” clearly returns the debate back to the traditional view of 
international human rights law which “rests upon the bedrock role of States.”150 
The Ruggie Report not only follows the existing legal doctrine, but echoes the 
historicist ideology that views the nation-state as the privileged subject of 
historical development. In doing so, the Ruggie Report emphasizes that the “root 
cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance 
gaps created by globalization.”151 These governance gaps are created by various 
political dynamics and economic pressures which leave state governments either 
unwilling or unable to effectively regulate corporate actors. In uncovering the 
systemic causes for these governance gaps, the Ruggie Report introduces a 
fundamental distinction between “home states” and “host states” that runs 
throughout the Report and structures its presentation of both the state duty to 
protect and the need for more effective remedies in two important respects152 In 
the end, given the political volatility created by the issuance of the Draft Norms, 
however, the Ruggie Report did not offer any concrete policy proposals. Rather, 
the Report limited itself to effectively analyzing the global economic and political 
causes behind the governance gaps which result in human right violations by 
transnational corporations and proposing a very general framework for 
developing “a more systemic response” to the problem.153 
                                                 
147  Id. at ¶ 71. 
148  John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises), Protect, Respect & Remedy: a Framework 
for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Ruggie Report]. 
149  Id. at ¶ 1. 
150  Id. at ¶ 50. 
151  Id. at ¶ 3. 
152  See id. at ¶ 14. 
153  Id. at ¶ 106. 
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The Ruggie Report was, on the whole, favorably received within the U.N. 
On June 18, 2008, the UNHRC extended the SRSG's mandate for another three 
years, directing John Ruggie to begin the necessary work of operationalizing the 
Ruggie Report's framework.154 At the end of its second term, the SRSG issued its 
Guiding Principles, which provide guidance to states and business for 
implementing the “protect, respect, and remedy” framework.155 The Guiding 
Principles center on the notion that the responsibility of businesses to respect 
human rights “exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill 
their own human rights obligations” and that this responsibility “exists over and 
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.”156  
This independent responsibility requires businesses to “[a]void causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities” and to 
“prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
operations.”157  
The Guiding Principles set forth three different “policies and processes” for 
businesses in order to meet these responsibilities.158 First, businesses should have 
a “policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights.”159 
This policy should be expressed in a formal statement that is approved at the most 
senior levels of management, made publicly available, and reflected in the business 
operations and procedures.160 Second, businesses should institute a “human rights 
due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their impacts on human rights.”161 This due diligence process should be 
sufficiently robust to reflect the scope of the enterprises’ operations, be conducted 
on a periodic and on-going basis, and entail consultation with groups whose 
human rights are likely to be affected by the business activities.162 Third, businesses 
should establish processes “to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights 
impacts they cause or to which they contribute.”163 In doing so businesses should 
                                                 
154  Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/8/7 (June 18, 2008). 
155  John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011). 
156  Id. at 13 (Principle 11). 
157  Id. at 14 (Principle 13). 
158  Id. at 15 (Principle 15). 
159  Id. at 15 (Principle 15) 
160  Id. at 15 (Principle 16). 
161  Id. at 15 (Principle 15). 
162  Id. at 15–16 (Principles 17 and 18); see also id. 16–20 (Principles 19–21) (setting forth further detailed 
guidelines regarding the due diligence process). 
163  Id. at 15 (Principle 15). 
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“cooperate” in the remediation of human rights violations by participating in 
established “legitimate processes,” including “cooperation with judicial 
mechanism[s]” where appropriate.164 
The Guiding Principles were adopted by the UNHRC, which promptly set 
up a five-member Working Group to “promote the effective and comprehensive 
dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles.”165 However, in 
promoting the Guiding Principles, the Working Group has been restrained by the 
fundamental fact that “the Guiding Principles are not in themselves legally 
binding,” but merely act to “clarify the existing State obligations.”166 
Consequently, effective implementation of the Guiding Principles remains 
constrained, especially as it concerns the third pillar of ensuring access to an 
effective remedy. Indeed, in the absence of any legally binding obligations, access 
to judicial remedies remains elusive. Consequently, the Working Group has 
focused at times on access to “non-judicial grievance mechanisms.”167 
Dissatisfied with the non-binding character of the Guiding Principles and 
the resulting limitations on the Working Group, the Republic of Ecuador issued 
a call to the UNHRC for the adoption of “an international legally binding 
instrument, included within the U.N. system, which would clarify the obligations 
of transnational corporations in the field of human rights, as well as of 
corporations in relation to States.”168 It was not surprising that Ecuador would 
take the lead on finding a legally binding instrument, for Ecuador had been at the 
center of a high-profile and lengthy litigation against Chevron related to the 
dumping of toxic waste in the Amazon from 1964 to 1992.169  According to 
Ecuador’s proposal, the Guiding Principles are an “important first step, but 
without a legally binding instrument, it will remain only as such: a ‘first step’ 
without further consequence.”170 A few months later, the UNHRC considered a 
                                                 
164  Id. at 20–21 (Principle 21). 
165  Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (June 7, 2011). The Working 
Group’s mandate has since been renewed on two separate occasions. See Human Rights Council 
Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 (July 15, 2014); Human Rights Council Res. 35/7, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/35/7 (July 14, 2017). 
166  Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/25/Add.3 (April 28, 2014). 
167  See id., passim. 
168  U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Statement of the Republic of Ecuador on Behalf of a Group of Countries 
at the 24rd [sic] Session of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 2013), http://perma.cc/7RMA-DJCQ. 
169  For an overview of this litigation and its relevance to the core issues of corporate accountability 
and human rights, see Pablo Fajardo & George Byrne, Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and 
Pursuing Justice in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Attorney Pablo Fajardo’s Perspective on Aguinda v. Chevron, 51 
HARV. INT’L L. J. ONLINE 181 (2011). 
170  UNHRC, supra note 168.  
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resolution submitted by Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela for 
the establishment of “an open-ended intergovernmental working group on a 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights.”171 The resolution passed by a vote of 
20 to 14, with 13 countries abstaining, and the Intergovernmental Working Group 
(IGWG) was established.172  
In the years since, the IGWG has conducted three sessions for collecting 
input from a variety of state governmental agencies, national human rights 
institutions, and NGOs.  Following these efforts, the IGWG has prepared and 
published on July 20, 2018, a so-called “Zero Draft” of a “Legally Binding 
Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.”173 The Zero Draft 
vests jurisdiction for enforcement of the instrument’s provisions with either the 
state where the alleged violations occurred or the home state where the 
corporation is domiciled.174 The proposed instrument expressly recognizes the 
right of victims to present claims and seek remedies, as well as the obligation of 
states party to investigate claims and provide legal appropriate judicial 
mechanisms for vindicating victims’ rights.175 Developing the Guiding Principles’ 
emphasis on corporate due diligence, the Zero Draft mandates that states party 
ensure that their domestic corporations undertake a due diligence process 
regarding the potential effects of their business operations on human rights.176 
Finally, at the heart of the proposed instrument, states party must ensure that their 
domestic laws hold businesses civilly and criminally liable for human rights 
violations.177  
                                                 
171  See UNHRC Res. 26/…, supra note 4.  
172  See UNHRC Res. 26/9, supra note 4. The countries voting in favor were: Algeria, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, China, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, 
Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The 
countries voting against the resolution were: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, Macedonia, United Kingdom, and 
the United States.  
173  Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In 
International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, http://perma.cc/WZ85-RYW2 [hereinafter Zero Draft]. 
174  Id. at art. 5. 
175  Id. at art. 8. 
176  Id. at art. 9. 
177  Id. at art. 10. 
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In addition to the Zero Draft, the IGWG has also proposed a Draft Optional 
Protocol,178 which is “centered on mechanisms of access to remedy for victims of 
abuses committed in the context of business activities.”179 The Draft Optional 
Protocol outlines the minimum discovery that state courts must make available.180 
Courts of states party shall have the competence to review the due diligence 
obligations of corporations within their jurisdictions.181 Furthermore, states party 
are to provide procedural mechanisms for vindicating claims “brought by victims 
or a group of victims.”182 The IGWG recently held a fourth session on October 
15–19, 2018, to discuss the Zero Draft and the Optional Protocol. 
B.  Integrating Corporate Accountabili ty into 
Transitional  Justice 
Given this history and the most recent developments since the adoption of 
the Guiding Principles, the field of transitional justice has an opportunity to take 
a more active role in both holding transnational corporations accountable for their 
part in human rights violations and advancing the development of international 
legal mechanisms for corporate accountability.183 By proactively addressing the 
role of corporate actors in human rights violations, transitional justice regimes are 
more likely to intervene in the structures of global postcolonial governance that 
have systematically produced human rights violations.184 Doing so will also 
advance transitional justice’s more immediate goals of promoting institutional 
reform, establishing a truthful account of the past, and securing justice for victims. 
In Sierra Leone, for example, the failure to address the underlying economic 
structures and actors has resulted in transitional justice efforts being perceived as 
incomplete.185 
                                                 
178  Off. of the U.N. Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally Binding Instrument 
to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, http://perma.cc/2NYM-3BQU [hereinafter Draft Optional Protocol]. 
179  Letter from the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the U.N. and other International Organizations 
in Geneva (Sept. 4, 2018), http://perma.cc/K5QK-ZNLU. 
180  Draft Optional Protocol, supra note 178, at art. 4. 
181  Id. at art. 5. 
182  Id. at art. 6. 
183  The academic literature is beginning to explore the possibilities of linking transitional justice to 
corporate accountability. See, for example, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Sabine Michalowski ed., 2013); see also THE ECONOMIC ACCOMPLICES TO 
THE ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP: OUTSTANDING DEBTS (H. Verbitsky and J. Bohoslavsky eds. 
2015); JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION (D. Sharp ed., 2014). 
184  Id. 
185  The transitional justice program in Sierra Leone has been criticized for failing to address the larger 
economic and developmental issues leading up to the conflict. See, for example, Rosalind Shaw, 
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Efforts to integrate corporate accountability into mechanisms of transitional 
justice should be located in three primary areas: promoting and developing a 
binding instrument for corporate accountability, designing truth and 
reconciliation committees that expressly consider the part played by corporate 
actors, and setting up tribunals with jurisdiction to hold businesses accountable. 
Given the multilateral character of transitional justice, successful efforts in any 
one of these areas will have positive effects on each of the others. Of course, 
political dynamics and considerations will inevitably thwart many of these efforts, 
but the objective of corporate accountability, even if achieved only partially and 
piecemeal, will still generally advance the work of transitional justice.186 
On the level of advocacy, the transitional justice community can and should 
play a more active role in the work of the IGWG. A legally binding instrument 
for corporate accountability would greatly advance the objectives and work of 
transitional justice.187 Conversely, the international human rights community, 
including the IGWG, should more actively seek input from those who are directly 
engaged in the work of transitional justice. Indeed, those involved in transitional 
justice efforts, particularly in post-conflict societies, have firsthand experience and 
understanding of the role that corporations can play in human rights violations.  
While the scholarship in recent years has begun to recognize that the 
objectives of corporate accountability and transitional justice have much in 
common and should mutually support each other, this recognition has yet to 
inform the work of the IGWG in any consistent manner. In this regard, the work 
of the Center for the Study of Law, Justice, and Society—Dejusticia—has been at 
the forefront.188 In one of the few express interventions in the IGWG’s work from 
the vantage point of transitional justice, Dejusticia issued a statement during the 
Second Session explaining that a binding mechanism for closing the “impunity 
gap” is paramount “if we want to guarantee the success of any transitional justice 
process.”189 A strong international regime of corporate accountability with clear 
norms and binding mechanisms would further support transitional justice efforts 
                                                 
Linking Justice with Reintegration? Ex-Combatants and the Sierra Leone Experiment, in LOCALIZING 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw 
& Lars Waldorf eds., 2013); see also Shaw, supra note 11; see also EVALUATING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PEACE BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE (Kirsten Ainley et al. 
eds., 2015).  
186  See generally Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
837 (2005); see also THE POLITICS OF MEMORY, supra note 11; Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Law 
and Politics in Transitional Justice, 18 ANN. R. L. & POL. 303 (2015). 
187  See generally Leigh A. Payne et al., Can a Treaty on Business and Human Rights Help Achieve Transitional 
Justice Goals?, 1 HOMA PUBLICA: INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. & BUS. 96 (2017). 
188  See generally Letter from Dejusticia to U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Transitional Justice Architecture and 
Corporate Accountability, http://perma.cc/7HCT-K6KY. 
189  Id. 
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to “satisfy the right to justice of victims of grave human rights and to achieve non-
repetition of violence and social development.”190 A sanctioned international 
regime of corporate accountability would potentially counterbalance the ever-
present political and economic resistance put up by corporations to being involved 
in the transitional justice process. Corporations often raise the specter of 
disinvestment when confronted with the transitional justice regimes.191 Such 
tactics are particularly effective in the context of post-conflict societies that are 
often underdeveloped and constantly in need of reliable foreign financial 
investment. This intervention by Dejusticia should lead the way for more 
involvement with the work of the IGWG as discussions of the Zero Draft get 
underway. 
Truth Commissions have a particularly important role to play in integrating 
corporate accountability into transitional justice regimes, and there are a number 
of systemic ways that truth commissions can become more effective in this regard. 
Where possible, the mandate of any newly constituted Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) should expressly include the investigation of corporate actors. 
Similarly, expanding the subpoena power of the TRC where possible to reach 
corporate actors would compel corporations to comply, where they otherwise 
would not do so voluntarily.192 The investigative work of a TRC should be 
expressly guided by the Guiding Principles, and any reports issued by the TRC 
should similarly expressly focus on them. For example, a robust investigation 
should include explicit consideration of how the relevant states have failed in their 
duty to protect individuals from human rights abuses by corporate actors. Such 
an inquiry would focus not only on the host state where the corporation 
conducted its operations, but also the home state where the corporation is 
domiciled. Furthermore, when investigating the involvement of corporate actors, 
the TRC should examine and detail the ways in which the corporate actors have 
not met the responsibilities outlined in the Guiding Principles. In this respect, 
specific attention should be paid to not only the actual human rights violations 
attributable to the business’s operations, but also to more specific corporate 
                                                 
190  Id. 
191  See id. (highlighting corporate claims that “private property was in danger” in the lead-up to the 
plebiscite on the peace accord). 
192  The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was one of the few to expressly 
incorporate corporate actors into its work. However, it failed to use its subpoena powers to compel 
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Transcript of Business Sector Hearings, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (S. Afr.) (Nov. 11, 
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South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s investigation of business complicity in 
apartheid regime). 
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management issues including its human rights policies and due diligence. Finally, 
TRCs should make every effort to involve corporations in the reconciliation 
process and pressure businesses to provide remediation mechanisms consistent 
with the Guiding Principles.  
Explicit examination of corporate actors by TRCs can have consequential 
effects for judicial enforcement. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia, for example, expressly considered the role that businesses played in the 
extended civil conflict and detailed the role played by a number of corporate 
actors.193 Arms dealer Guus Kouwenhoven was among the individuals mentioned. 
Kouwenhoven used his timber business to cover his weapons smuggling 
operation, which supplied arms to Charles Taylor.194 Kouwenhoven’s activities 
were explicitly detailed in the work of the Liberian TRC, which also recommended 
that foreign jurisdictions prosecute individuals such as Kouwenhoven.195 Heeding 
the TRC’s recommendation, a court in the Netherlands sentenced Kouwenhoven 
to 19 years in prison for his participation in war crimes in Liberia.196 The 
Kouwenhoven case highlights the international pressure that TRCs can potentially 
place on home states to honor their responsibilities with respect to human rights 
violations by corporate actors. The implementation of a binding instrument would 
only increase such leverage. 
Finally, corporate accountability should factor into the design and structure 
of criminal tribunals.197 Jurisdiction over corporate entities remains the biggest 
obstacle to effective legal accountability for corporate actors. For example, when 
the ICC was being established there was considerable debate about whether the 
jurisdiction of the ICC should include legal persons, in addition to natural 
persons.198 After weeks of intense debate, the proposal was withdrawn, however, 
over irresolvable political disagreements about how such jurisdiction would be 
implemented.199 Furthermore, the lack of uniformity or consensus among 
                                                 
193  TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF LIBERIA, VOLUME 3, TITLE III: ECONOMIC CRIMES 
AND THE CONFLICT, EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (2009). 
194  See Ruben Carranza, Dutch Court Convicts Arms Dealer for Role in Liberian Atrocities. What Does it Say 
about Justice for Economic Crime?, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (May 4, 2017). 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  See generally STEVEN D. ROPER AND LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) 
for a general overview of design issues in setting up transitional justice tribunals. 
198  See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: 
Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139–95 (M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) 
(detailing the historical debate surrounding the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction).  
199  Id. at 146–158. 
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signatory states regarding the extent of criminal liability for corporations and the 
lack, within some states, of any legal codification for such liability presented 
complementarity challenges that ultimately doomed the proposal.200 Nevertheless, 
the issue was put front and center for all future tribunals whose mandate includes 
the enforcement of international human rights laws. 
In the wake of the original ICC proposal, a number of tribunals have been 
contemplated that would have jurisdiction over legal persons, including 
corporations, committing human rights violations. The Liberian TRC, for 
instance, recommended “prosecution for economic crimes, as gross human rights 
violations, all those persons, natural and artificial it finds responsible for the 
commission of economic crimes during the period of the Liberian conflict.”201 In 
pursuit of such prosecutions, the Liberian TRC further recommended that an 
Extraordinary Criminal Tribunal for Liberia be established for the prosecution of 
specifically identified human rights violations.202 Similarly, the African Union has 
proposed the institution of a criminal law section of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (ACJHR) that would include jurisdiction over international 
and transnational crimes and the ability to adjudicate claims against 
corporations.203 The protocol will go into effect once fifteen member states sign 
the Protocol; to date, eleven member states have done so.204 Relatedly, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has also recently asserted its jurisdiction over a 
Lebanese broadcasting company for allegedly interfering in the administration of 
justice.205 All of these instances represent incremental steps in a growing 
international recognition that corporate actors are liable for criminal activity and 
should, accordingly, be subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant courts.  Both 
current and future tribunals engaged in the work of transitional justice should 
                                                 
200  See Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. 
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promote the further development of this international norm by including 
corporate actors within their jurisdiction. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
The historical legacies of colonial rule permeate the global postcolonial 
governance structures that systematically produce social instability, political 
violence, and human rights violations. Transitional justice rightfully aims to 
intervene in such situations in an effort to achieve restorative justice. To be lasting, 
however, the work of transitional justice must address the social, political, and 
economic conditions underlying these humanitarian crises. Recent developments 
in the movement for corporate accountability present transitional justice with an 
opportunity to confront and challenge the neocolonial structures of global order. 
Through effective integration of the Guiding Principles within its practices, as well 
as sustained engagement with the corporate accountability movement within the 
international legal community, transitional justice may advance its own objectives 
and contribute to the general decolonization of the existing global order. 
 
